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1	For the Defendants:	
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3	GERALD SHARGEL, ESQ.	
4	SARITA KEDIA, ESQ.	
5	LESLIE DUBIOS, ESQ.	
6	(For P. Gotti)	
7		
8	GEORGE SANTANGELO, ESQ.	
9	(For A. Ciccone)	
10		
11	JOSEPH CORROZZO, ESQ.	•
12	(For R.V. Gotti)	
13		
14	RICHARD WARE LEVITT, ESQ.	
15	(For P. Cassarino)	
16		
17	GERALD SHARGEL, ESQ.	
18	(For J. Brancato)	
19		
20	HARRY BATCHELDER, ESQ.	
21	(For R.G. Gotti)	
22		
23	RICHARD MEDINA, ESQ.	
24	(For R. Bondi)	
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THE COURT:

THE CLERK: Criminal cause for a status conference, United States of America versus Peter Gotti, et al. I ask the parties if you can state your appearances, for the record. MR. GENSER: Andrew Genser for the Government. Good afternoon, your Honor. Katya Jestin for the government. MS. JESTIN: THE COURT: If you would be kind enough, I am going to ask you to tell the Court who is here for the defendants, Mr. Shargel. MR. SHARGEL: Yes, your Honor. I am of course standing before you on behalf of Peter Gotti, with my associate, Leslie Dubios. Mr. Santangelo is here representing Anthony Ciccone. Mr. Mitchell is always here. MR. SANTANGELO: MR. SHARGEL: Yes. John Mitchell as well. Joseph Corrozzo represents Richard V. Gotti. Rich Levitt is here, represents Primo Cassarino. I am standing in on behalf of Mr. Tacopina this afternoon because he was out of the district, for Jerome Brancato. Rich Gotti is here represented by Harry Batchelder. Richard Bondi is here represented by Rich Medina.

I appreciate that. No slight to any of

the fine array of attorneys here. I think I can call upon Mr. Shargel to do some administrative work for the Court, to move things along.

We have a lot of things to talk about today. What's the right order of priority?

I guess the first thing we ought to talk about is how you folks have progressed with the jury questionnaire.

Why don't you report to the court first, Mr. Genser.

MR. GENSER: Judge, actually, if the Court wouldn't mind, I defer to Mr. Shargel on that.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shargel.

MR. SHARGEL: The parties have spoken. Your Honor, apparently, there is more time that is needed to deal with the question of the jurors that should be agreed upon to be stricken for cause. We are ready. We have our list. I am prepared to give our list to the government this afternoon. I could even supply the list to the Court. Then, later this week or early next week we will have a full report for your Honor.

THE COURT: You need a little more time. You are making satisfactory progress?

MR. SHARGEL: We definitely are. As I said, I have the list right here.

THE COURT: What I am contemplating doing, just to

give you all a heads up in terms of how we are going to process the selection of the jury, it will be something like this.

I will be here next Monday, Tuesday, and Thursday at your disposal. For sure we have to come to rest with the number of qualified jurors who will be subject to be in summons for potential selection come January 6th.

Maybe I should put this down for Tuesday for that purpose.

MR. SHARGEL: The only problem with Tuesday, Judge, is that obviously -- That's Christmas Eve.

THE COURT: I am open to discussions.

MR. SHARGEL: I suggest -- let me canvass the array.

THE COURT: I could do it Thursday. That is the best.

MR. SHARGEL: Here is what we'll do. Since I am of the Hebrew persuasion, as you might know, I can be here on Tuesday representing -- if the defendants are excused, because this is really just roll up your sleeves and work on what the challenges are. If the defendants are excused and if certain counsel are excused, those counsel that are excused I will stand in for. This is a selective effort so I won't have the authority to speak on behalf of every defendant. We can do it on Tuesday.

THE COURT: There is going to be a joint selection process. As long as everybody here agrees to allow me to meet with the government attorney and Mr. Shargel on Tuesday to hear whatever problems you may have in terms of the jury questionnaire scenario, we can proceed on that basis.

Anybody have any problems with that.

MR. CORROZZO: No, your Honor, with the understanding also that the defendants will be excused.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GENSER: We can be here Tuesday morning. I would ask if we could do it possibly in the morning because there are travel issues later in the day.

THE COURT: Let's look at 10:00.

MR. SHARGEL: That is fine.

THE COURT: We have to get that done because I am told by the people in charge of making copies of things they have to have everything as soon as possible to do the necessary ministerial work to get everything in order. We will be able to attend to that Tuesday.

MR. SHARGEL: I would like alert your Honor to the fact from our side there is a substantial number. I think we will have no problem with this very theory ultimately, or I hope there is no problem ultimately. I want to alert you to the fact there are a substantial number of jurors where it seems obvious that calling them back would be fruitless.

THE COURT: You compile it. Discrete lists. I will make my calls on it. We'll try to get it done with Tuesday. If not, I will finish it up on Thursday. We will use next week for that purpose.

MR. SHARGEL: Fine. I have a catalog. It is not a long catalog. I have a number of housekeeping issues in order to get this case trial ready. I would like to put them before your Honor, if I may. I would like to deal with them before your Honor goes away. I would like to deal with them in the presence of all counsel and defendants.

THE COURT: We are here to spend whatever time is needed today to take care of a host of things. I have these motions I want to address as well. Couple of other thoughts on my mind.

Before we engage in that colloquy, let me just return to the jury selection process.

Here is what I plan to do. Each of my colleagues does it a little differently but this is what I am most comfortable with doing, and I invite your suggestions if you have any issues with what I am about to propose.

On January 6, I plan to summon 80 perspective jurors to court based upon what comes out of the questionnaire process. Then, instead of questioning each one individually, which I think is tedious and not necessarily, you know, economical in terms of the effective use of our

time, I am going to have waves of seven come into the courtroom at a time. We'll question those seven collectively.

If, you know, something happens untoward, we'll lose seven jurors. I don't think there is a great risk here that we are going to have a problem if I take seven at a time. The others will be kept outside of the courtroom and we'll bring in seven subsequent panels, so to speak, as we address each of these panels in turn.

Then I will ask some questions which will give you folks the opportunity to hear them speak which is important. At that time, I will also solicit whatever specific questions you would like me to post to those individual jurors. I think that can be handled okay.

We're going to then proceed until we qualify the requisite number to spread throughout the courtroom on the 6th of January for exercise of the challenges.

MR. SHARGEL: If I may. I probably have gone through this process --

THE COURT: You have done it more than I have.

MR. SHARGEL: -- a lot of times.

I know that you want to do it as expeditiously as possible. I know, also, you have discretion to do it in any way you choose fit.

Please let me tell you that when we have a

questionnaire such as the questionnaire we have here, this is a questionnaire that's been used in this district before in substantial part. The problem is it delves into opinions about government cooperators, about the subjects that will be raised at trial, and allegations of organized crime.

It has been my experience that when a prospective juror is asked follow-up questions on what they've said in the questionnaire -- I am not talking about the people that obviously have been disqualified with expressions of blatant prejudice. When the following is done, it will be -- there are two problems as I see it.

THE COURT: You think I have to do it one by one?

MR. SHARGEL: Everyone has done it by one by one.

I know that Judge Korman, Judge Trager -- I could name every judge in the courthouse. Everybody has done it one by one because necessity dictates that.

Your Honor, I don't want to be the profit of gloom but I think if your Honor starts it the way that you suggest, it is going to take more time in the end. I know that Mr. Genser has been through this with me on a trial before.

THE COURT: It just seemed to me I could handle a couple at a time.

What do you think?

MR. GENSER: I think, as a practical matter, even if you have seven seated in the jury box, it is going to turn

out to be individual questioning anyway. Given the risk of something being said that affects somebody else, if we are going to end up in that situation -- I haven't done it as many times as Mr. Shargel but I have done it a few times. It has been the one on one. I think we can do it quickly. I would tend to agree that's the issue.

THE COURT: I will do it one by one. I was thinking of a way of probably moving the process along a little more expeditiously than that.

I thought hard about it.

MR. GENSER: We could try it.

MR. SHARGEL: I strongly suggest the one by one.

There is a reason why everyone in the Southern District,

everyone in the Eastern District has done it this way. I

respect innovation.

THE COURT: Can I place my own unique imprimatur on the process.

MR. SHARGEL: I am just concerned we are going to run into a problem.

THE COURT: You don't want a copy-cat judge, do you?

MR. SHARGEL: No, I never wanted that.

THE COURT: All right. We'll do it one by one.

Nobody has raised a question of whether anybody wants
additional peremptory challenges?

MR. SHARGEL: That is something I wanted to raise 2 with you. 3 THE COURT: Let's do that now. Maybe Mr. Santangelo would like to stand next to you. 4 5 MR . SANTANGELO: I will let Mr. Shargel handle it. 6 MR. SHARGEL: I welcome anyone. 7 Under the rule we're afforded ten, government six. 8 Under the rule we have the opportunity to ask for additional 9 challenges. 10 THE COURT: You want additional challenges? 11 MR. SHARGEL: We would like, if it pleases the 12: Court, one additional challenge for each one of the 13 defendants. 14 THE COURT: I don't know whether I can give you that much. If I do that, I would balance it out by giving 15 16 the government some additional challenges. That requires 17 consent. 18 MR. SHARGEL: The rules says --19 THE COURT: I can condition your request on your 20 consenting to the government being given some additional 21 challenges also. 22 Why don't you talk to each other. 23 MR. SHARGEL: 15 seconds. 24 MR. SHARGEL: We are not going to consent, and say 25 10 and 6.

THE COURT: Absent consent.

MR. SHARGEL: That is correct.

THE COURT: It may not be reversible error but I don't want to deal with it on that basis. Let's stay 10 and 6.

When we qualify people we'll have them all in the courtroom, and then you'll make peremptory challenges against the group of 28, and we'll be left 12 jurors.

MR. SHARGEL: Assuming six alternates, we need 40.

THE COURT: We have some chase. My thinking is first get the jury and then we'll go through the process with the alternates.

I think it is easier because you are dealing with 28, which is enough. We'll do the alternates after that. Sometimes we even get agreement on the alternates from a group of 28. We'll see about that.

We're pretty much squared away with that. I guess it will take us a few days to go through that selection process.

Let's move that to one side. Let's hear your housekeeping concerns. We'll see whether they might coalesce with some of my concerns.

One, I alerted your Honor to the fact that we're having some difficulty with the 3500 material. Following the letter I submitted to your Honor, the government has agreed,

and I think you got a letter reflecting this, from our office, that the government has agreed to bear the cost of coping the 3500 material. That's not the problem.

The problem is, the government has chosen a method of producing the 3500 material that is somewhat unorthodoxed. That is, at the time they think the 3500 material should be produced, it is produced. Instead of being produced to the defendants, it is produced to First Choice Copy. After the government in this case, in this first wave of 3500 material -- I didn't mean to say in this case -- in the first wave of 3500 material, after the government gave First Choice Copy the green light to give us the 3500 material, I waited nearly a week to get the material. That's just unacceptable. It is like in the case where the government is not producing all the 3500 material at once and is choosing to produce it in waves.

At the time that it is going to be produced, we need to have it and have it that day .

THE COURT: How much have you received?

MR. SHARGEL: We received two witnesses. One is an expert witness with prior testimony, Agent Hagerty, with prior testimony. Another is a cooperating witness named Michael D'urso with a good amount of 3500 material. A couple thousand pages, I would estimate, and to get this delayed -- the statute is specific. The Jencks case is specific. The

government has to produce it. If they know that they were going to produce something next Monday, it is not give it to First Choice next Monday. Give it to the defendants next Monday. We'll come down here and pick it up.

THE COURT: Mr. Genser, what is going on here?

MR. GENSER: Judge, the statute says that we don't have to produce 3500 material until after the witness testifies.

THE COURT: We know that. I am just going to adjourn the case and we are going to wait for weeks before we start the trial. We all understand in the realistic world that it is not going to happen that way.

MR. GENSER: Judge, as Mr. Shargel alluded to, there was a voluminous quantity of copying that needed to be done. Our office just didn't have the resources to do it. We out-sourced it to First Choice.

THE COURT: There is nothing wrong with that. The problem is counsel is not getting the material --

MR. GENSER: It seems like he has received it. It is still several weeks before any witnesses are going to testify.

THE COURT: Give me a realistic sense of what we are talking about. How much more has to be delivered, really delivered to counsel?

MR. GENSER: To the extent that we have witnesses

that don't have that volume of 3500 material, we'll do the copying in-house and send it directly to the defense. To the extent it is too much for us to handle in-house, we'll out-source and endeavor to do it so that there is sufficient lead time so that they get it when we would otherwise have turned it over.

THE COURT: You are going to have expedite your efforts. What I will do, I have no way of really micromanaging this nor do I have the inclination to do that. This is the type of thing which rely upon the good faith efforts of professional counsel.

If there is a snag, then I am just going to hold up the start of the trial. I will let you know right now. I can't make that judgment as I sit here today. That will be the consequence.

MR. SHARGEL: Keep in mind that's what they want.

THE COURT: Not a question of fault.

MR. GENSER: Absolutely, Judge. We turned this material over. I think at the time we turned it over, it was more than a month before trial was going to start. We are endeavoring to get this stuff to them.

THE COURT: You made available to the defendant, I understand from what I hear, there is a need for First Choice to reproduce this. It takes a period of time. I am not suggesting you acted in bath faith. I am saying we have to

realistically effectively do better.

MR. SHARGEL: One more thing. It has been my experience with the prosecution in this district and in fact, with Mr. Genser. I don't see why it should be a problem what I am about to suggest.

Obviously we don't them have a witness list in the case. Obviously there are going to be other cooperating witnesses. If history is any teacher, we can expect there will be cooperating witnesses who have testified in other trials. We're talking about hundreds if not sometimes thousands of pages. Right now I can have no complaint because Mr. Genser appropriately points out that we have a fair amount of time before Mr. D'Urso takes the stand and there's adequate time to review the material.

I cannot get 3500 material in a carton on a Monday, and have the government say, it won't be two weeks -- two weeks will go before that witness appears. In the middle of trial, your Honor knows full well I can't spend time reading thousands of pages.

THE COURT: I understand that. Unless you clone yourself you are not going to be able to do both chores at the same time.

MR. SHARGEL: Correct.

THE COURT: Be mindful of that.

MR. GENSER: We will.

MR. SHARGEL: I would think those witnesses who are cooperating witness with the Witness Protection Program, there is no reason it can't all be turned over now.

THE COURT: Let's do that this week if you can do that.

What will happen is, rather than to put counsel in this impossible position of having to employ full energies and mental capacities to deal with the case as it is unfolding and at the same time have to review voluminous documents, even though the witness may not be called for two weeks, I am not going to put them in that type of position. I will adjourn the trial to give them the opportunity to spend whatever time they need to review that material. That is the fairest thing to do. I can only do one thing at a time.

MR. GENSER: As Mr. Shargel acknowledges, he is raising issues but also acknowledging we have responsively turned the material over to him sufficiently in advance. We are going to continue to do that

THE COURT: I will monitor this thing and I am just giving you a word of caution that I will not hesitate to send the jury home after the trial starts for some indeterminable period of time if I find defense counsel is being overburdened with the need to be able to absorb large volumes of papers.

MR. GENSER: Understood.

THE COURT: Act accordingly.

MR. SHARGEL: Next item. We're requesting the Court order the government to supply in the next several days or a week at most --

THE COURT: John Does.

MR. SHARGEL: No, I am not there.

A document list, a list of documents they intend to introduce in their chase in chief. I am not suggesting they are bound by the list or they can't add a document. It will be necessary for the orderly trial process to have copies of the documents that they are going to introduce in their chase in chief. We've gotten many, many documents. We have no idea what they are actually putting in now. To have those exhibits premarked so if an exhibit is offered -- let's think about the practicalities of it. If an exhibit is offered, we have to go on an easter egg hunt to find the exhibits. All counsel have to get together, could I see a copy, could I see a copy. It will take forever to get a document in evidence.

The government should prepare the universe of documents it intends to introduce, mark the documents and deliver those documents to the defense. This way when they say Government Exhibit 75, everyone at the table will know what Government 75 is.

THE COURT: Makes perfect sense. I usually get an

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MR. GENSER:

exhibit list in advance of the trial. I would like to have this significantly in advance of this trial because of the obvious numerosity of people and personalities. I think you could accommodate me and defense counsel as well in that respect. MR. GENSER: Yes, Judge. We're preparing our documents and marking our exhibits and compiling our lists and we are going to turn them over just as soon as we can. We expect that to be soon. THE COURT: Give me a little more specifics than that. MR. GENSER: We are going to try and do it this coming week. That's more specific. THE COURT: I could hopefully have a list from you by the end of this week. What do you anticipate in terms of the number of actual documents you want before the jury? MR. GENSER: I don't think it is going to be a document-intensive case, judge. THE COURT: It doesn't sound like that to me. You have a list of tapes and transcripts already in place for that. You could turn that over specifically, I guess, right? MR. GENSER: Judge, we have turned over as... THE COURT: I call it the ones you plan to use.

What we have done is turned over a set

of excerpted transcripts that include those that we intend to use. We're still in the process of narrowing that down. We hope to narrow it down further.

THE COURT: Do that. I am also interested in my capacity to hopefully intelligently manage the trial by having a chance to look at those excerpts in advance of the trial too.

So you serve dual purposes. One, fairness to the defense counsel and fairness to the Court. Get them as quickly as you can. Try to move the process along by having those documents which you have come to peace with identified and transmitted to me by the end of next week. Counsel as well, of course. At least we'll be moving along in that process.

MR. GENSER: Judge, I think we can accelerate the process if we are permitted to do it sort of in waves. In other words, what we have ready we can do. It may take a little while longer to get to the final list as it were for what we are going to be using towards the end of the trial.

THE COURT: I will have a sense as to whether the government is making its best good faith efforts in terms of doing common sense things. Let's have a good wave come in a few days.

MR. GENSER: Let me assure the Court we're not holding back on anything.

THE COURT: It is not --

MR. GENSER: Doing as best we can.

THE COURT: I am not casting blame on you. I am just practically managing the case in a sensible way. Don't really feel that you have to be defensive or suggesting anything other than good faith on the part of the government. Notwithstanding good faith, certain things have to be accomplished in order to have an orderly effective trial. That's all I am telling you.

MR. GENSER: Thank you, judge.

THE COURT: Let me see good progress by the end of next week.

MR. SHARGEL: Judge, with all respect, I don't think that is workable when it comes to the tapes and the transcripts. I think that the defense needs to know before the trial starts or at the time the trial starts what tapes the government is going to introduce in its case in chief.

THE COURT: I think that's a fair request.

MR. SHARGEL: I want to give you another reason, if I may. There may be evidentiary objections that should be made in limine. It is impossible to do that if we are going to be told a day before or two days before tapes are going to be played.

THE COURT: This is not going to happen that way.

Mr. Genser is not suggesting that either. The conversation

we're having right now is somehow general. We'll get more focused and specific if needs be. For present purposes we understand each other.

I expect to see a lot of things happening next week. Try by the end of Thursday because I am going to be away the following week. This way I will have some reading material to take with me to Puerto Rico.

MR. SHARGEL: As a practical matter with regard to the transcripts the government is going to be producing, could we have that sent directly to the defense rather than First Choice?

THE COURT: That part you could send directly to them I am sure.

MR. GENSER: All right, judge.

THE COURT: Also, you are going to want to husband your energies because you want to be effective before the jury. You don't want to overburden them and things of that nature. After a while sometimes it becomes counter productive in terms of the juries impatience. You want to make an effort to help the jury as well.

Okay.

MR. GENSER: Yes.

MR. SHARGEL: There is only one point I have. Your Honor received, I think the day before yesterday, on Wednesday, the government's motion which was titled 404(b) to

admit certain evidence pursuant to 404(b) and other in limine 1 2 application. 3 THE COURT: I hadn't seen that before yesterday. 4 MR. SHARGEL: I want to answer that in writing. I 5 want until January 6, perhaps or even the week after. 6 THE COURT: I have a lot of material to deal with 7 here today. When did you send the 404(b) letter to me? 8 MR. SHARGEL: Wednesday. 9 MR. GENSER: I think it was one week ago. 10 MS. JESTIN: I think Monday. 11 MR. GENSER: It was Monday, yes. MR. SANTANGELO: I got it Tuesday. 12 13 THE COURT: I am glad you told me that because I --14 MR. GENSER: I believe it was hand delivered to 15 Mr. Shargel on Monday afternoon and FedExed to the rest of 16 defense counsel on Monday and hand delivered to your Honor's 17 chambers on Monday. 18 THE COURT: We'll find it. 19 Let us know if you can't find it. MS. JESTIN: 20 THE COURT: Just double-check. I have my law 21 clerk here, so I am going to tell them right now: Find the 22 404(b) letter as quickly as you can. Okay. How much time do you need? You said until January 23 24 6? 25 MR. SHARGEL: We have a lot deal with. I am going

to ask for the end of that week. I don't think actually --1 2 mid-week January 8th. 3 THE COURT: Try to flush it out during the jury selection week. Of course you can have until, what, January 4 5 8? 6 MR. SHARGEL: January 8. THE COURT: Anything else. MR. SHARGEL: That's all I have. THE COURT: From the government's perspective, any administrative matters you want to address? MR. GENSER: Just to the extent the defense has documents or exhibits they intend to be offering, we have not received any reciprocal discovery whatsoever. I would ask for the same consideration. MR. SHARGEL: We understand our obligation under Rule 126, and we will comply. THE COURT: Fair enough. MR. GENSER: I am not sure if that is exactly what I asked for. MR. SHARGEL: With the same consideration. THE COURT: I will be monitoring it all. All right. So far so good. Now we have a slew of motions. Let me first address what I have labeled the general motions. Of course,

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it is understood that all defendants join in on all these motions. I think that is basically the process we have adopted. You have no need to be concerned about whether your rights are being preserved as far as the record that we will be making in this case.

I have a general boilerplate request for a bill of particulars. Is there any need that I have here to really address anything about that?

I don't think so.

I have the Brady request again. These are general matters. I think we have spoken about them. I don't think we have to do anything further today. I have a notation about the 404(b) notice. We spoke about that.

I listed something about the request that the government produce certain individuals in Court to commit permit defense counsel to conduct interviews. Is there anything I need to address in terms of that?

MR. SHARGEL: Mr. Levitt has that motion.

THE COURT: The standard is, of course, defense counsel should have the opportunity to have access to witnesses and to question them. Of course, there are limits to what you can say to each other in respect to all of that. Certainly, defense are entitled to have access to prospective witnesses by the government.

What do you wish to say in that respect?

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MR. LEVITT: If I could backtrack for a moment. With respect to the Brady issue, we had addressed specifically a Brady letter sent to the defense by the government dated July 24th. In that letter, the government suggested that under Brady there are certain witnesses to whom we may wish to speak without providing us any additional information besides the name.

Your Honor knows from the motions that we have filed that we have endeavored to speak to the persons on that list essentially without success.

The government has --

THE COURT: They don't have to speak to you. They have to certainly --

MR. LEVITT: Certainly not. Since they haven't spoken to us, we don't have access to their testimony. The government is privileged to information that suggests these people possess Brady evidence. We therefore ask the government be required to turn over whatever documentary evidence they have.

THE COURT: I don't know whether the government knows about anything these people may have at their disposal.

MR. LEVITT: I don't mean what they possess but, rather, the government possesses in the way of 302s or other documents that reflect the type of information to which the government is privileged which led them to write the Brady

letter in the first place.

THE COURT: Do you know what Mr. Levitt's concerns are here, Mr. Genser?

MR. GENSER: The government's position is, we have complied with the dictates of Brady by alerting the defense to the identities of individuals who have potential Brady material or who may have potential Brady material.

THE COURT: If you know that there is such material, do you not have an obligation to disclose that?

MR. GENSER: First let me just state that we are aware that there is some information which they may consider to be potentially Brady material although we may not credit the information.

THE COURT: Sometimes there is a gray area.

MR. GENSER: Exactly. That's why we have alerted them to the identities of the individuals. They are free to subpoena those individuals and call them as trial witnesses. I don't think our obligation goes beyond that.

THE COURT: It seems to me -- I am just talking conceptually here; you know more about these people than I do obviously. It seems to me conceptually, if you know there is a particular document that you are aware of, even if it arguably is not physically in your possession, if that's what we are talking about --

MR. LEVITT: What I am talking about, your Honor,

is the following. The government interviews certain persons either through the government attorneys or the FBI. They generate a report, a 302, in the instance of some, maybe internal memo in the instance of another, which reflects the statement of a person out there which is exculpatory as to our clients.

It is our position that because we can't speak with these persons, it is not practical for the government to say, well, you can subpoen these people and have them testify cold. In the real world it doesn't work that way. We have endeavored to speak with these people who may be possessed of Brady-type evidence. They have declined to talk to us. They may have it in their file. The government may have.

THE COURT: I don't understand something here. If the government has in its file any document at all that could be exculpatory, the government has an obligation to turn that over. What am I missing here?

MR. GENSER: Judge, I think that our obligation under the law and the dictates of Brady is satisfied. If a witness has information which may be viewed by the defense as helpful to them, the cases are fairly clear that we satisfy our obligation by --

THE COURT: I am not talking about that. I am talking about if you have any documents or information that's written down that could arguably be exculpatory. Don't you

have an obligation to turn that over?

MR. GENSER: I guess we're going in a little bit --

THE COURT: We have --

MR. GENSER: -- of circles with that --

THE COURT: Things to do today. If there is any document you have at all that arguably could be viewed as exculpatory material, I am not talking about Giglio, but certainly if you have a problem, you send it to me in camera and I will look at it and decide whether to turn it over. We want to avoid post-verdict Brady motions.

MR. GENSER: May I make a suggestion. We will prepare a letter that summarizes the substance of any statement to us that might be viewed by the defense to have been exculpatory and identify who made the statement.

THE COURT: Okay.

Let's do that.

MR. GENSER: Otherwise we will get into the whole issue of redacting portions that don't qualify under Brady.

MR. SHARGEL: That's wholly unsatisfactory. I object to that. I make a constitutional objection under Brady v. Maryland or Giglio if they have information. They can't be the people who decide what's helpful or what fairly summarizes.

THE COURT: I will look at it. I don't want to really engage in prolonged debate here. I don't quite

understand. If there is a cat and mouse situation or whatnot, the way we cut through it all, you send to me everything you have in writing that arguably in your opinion could be deemed exculpatory. I will look at it. If you can't comfortably turn it over because you are concerned about the need to redact or whatever, you let me know. We are making a record here that could come back to haunt you if there is a conviction. I just alert you to that right now. You are going to have make sure that doesn't happen if you want whatever conviction that may be obtained to be upheld.

MR. GENSER: On that note, I believe that the constitutional dictates of Brady does put the onus on the government to actually sift through the material and select and identify that which might be Brady. To suggest that we should then open our -- I am not sure the Court truly wants us to open all of our files for the Court to review every document we have.

I think my suggestion would be let us prepare our letter and see if that satisfies the defense. If they have some other concerns or some follow-up requests for something concerning a witness. We'll address it at that time.

MR. SHARGEL: Could I say one thing to round out the record on this.

I understand it is the government's burden to go through its file and select Brady. I am not asking for open

file discovery. That is not the point.

What I hear Mr. Genser saying: he is going to write a letter and he is going to summarize the Brady material. In other words, he has already identified a document that qualifies as Brady material but instead of turning over the document either to the defense or at least to the Court, he is going to summarize what it is that is in the document.

I am not satisfied with his summary. Either he turns it over or if he has some question about it, he turns it over to the Court.

THE COURT: Look, I don't know how large a list you are talking about. Why don't you start in that direction. At least we've identified material. Let's see how large a list it is. You think about things as a result of this little dialogue we are having in Court today. My sense is that when I look at that list, we will see how large it is.

If there is -- may just call upon you to produce it? Let me look at it if you have a problem. You consider this, okay.

MR. GENSER: Yes, we'll consider that.

MR. LEVITT: When will that be done?

THE COURT: Obviously we want everything done quickly. That's why we are meeting here today, to give us time before January 6 to do all those things.

I know you folks have a lot of work to do. I realize that. There is no reason -- you tell me how much time do you think this will take?

MR. GENSER: To prepare a list of the materials. We can do that quickly.

THE COURT: All right. Do that quickly. Think about whether you will turn over any of this material to counsel and indicate what material you feel that you do not want to turn over to counsel. I will be looking at that. You make the selection process. I mean it is the government's responsibility, but I think that we will all well-served if you are very well-focused on all of this. Okay.

MR. LEVITT: Can that be done next week, your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, as compared to the week after that?

MR. LEVITT: Sure. Precisely. If in fact this discloses things we have to follow up on, it is going to be difficult as a practical matter.

THE COURT: I understand. I am advised the trial is going to last more than a couple of days.

MR. GENSER: We'll do that. We will identify the items and even summarize, go beyond what the Court has asked.

THE COURT: If you can do that by the end of next

week. I know we have Christmas day. I want people to enjoy the holiday. I understand that. Make your best efforts to get it done by the end of next week. If there's any follow-up problems, get back here on January 6. We'll focus on that during that week.

MR. GENSER: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. GENSER: We had next asked your Honor with regard to producing in Court informants who are under the control of the government for the defense to quash --

THE COURT: You want an opportunity to speak to them to see whether they will talk to you. How many people are you talking about?

MR. LEVITT: The government would know. I wouldn't.

MR. GENSER: Our response to that request was that we don't have informants that won't -- if we do have informants, they will be witnesses that will testify. So under the rule of Rosario and Saa, there is no obligation to identify them and grant them interviews pretrial. I am not sure what the request is directed to.

THE COURT: I will give you an opportunity during the course of the trial to speak to these people.

MR. LEVITT: Prior to the testimony, we'll have that opportunity?

1 THE COURT: We'll see how it works. These people could come into Court before they testify. We'll see whether 2 3 we'll give you a chance to talk to them. How does that 4 sound? 5 MR. GENSER: It is a fine, judge. MR. LEVITT: If we could do that in a timely way. 6 7 If it doesn't happen until after their testimony, it is 8 obviously irrelevant to us. 9 THE COURT: I am not going to march them in here 10 right now. I don't know who these people are. 11 MR. LEVITT: I don't either because they haven't 12 told us. THE COURT: It is a little premature to do that 13 14 now. We'll monitor that. 15 What else? 16 MR. SHARGEL: I have nothing else for today, judge. 17 THE COURT: Let's turn to the focussed motions. 18 Let's take Peter Gotti's first. 19 I have the motion to suppress the FBI wiretap and 20 FCI McKean. I reduced that to a written format. 21 MR. SHARGEL: We have received that. 22 THE COURT: The rest of these, I am going to 23 dispose all of this in Court today. Why did I put that in 24 writing? I thought it was valuable to husband this information and cobble it into something in written form. 25

1 Are there any Peter Gotti motions out there that I 2 may not be aware of? 3 MR. SHARGEL: We made the motion with respect to 4 timely production of the Brady based on --5 THE COURT: We discussed that just now. 6 MR. SHARGEL: Right. Beyond that, there is nothing 7 else. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 Mr. Shargel, unless there is something else you wish to bring to my attention, why don't I ask Mr. Cassarino 10 to step forward while I address his motions. 11 12 Mr. Levitt. 13 Apparently Mr. Cassarino is behaving himself on his release, which I am happy to see. I heard nothing to the 14 15 contrary from anybody else. How is his daughter doing? 16 MR. LEVITT: Doing well. There have been some issues concerning the next stage of the surgery. They had to 17 wait a while. Obviously it is going to be happening 18 19 fortunately, and we are very optimistic. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Once again, the written decision I rendered embraces Mr. Cassarino's suppression motion as well. 21 You have that ? 22 23 MR. LEVITT: We do. 24 THE COURT: I want to discuss a little bit your application to dismiss racketeering acts 23 to 30 and 49 to 25

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65 for lack of specificity or in the alternative to require the government to identify John Does 12 through 8.

I believe that the indictment is properly pled. have no problem with the specificity. Let's focus on the John Does. When do you think counsel should know the identity of these people? As I read your papers, you sort have taken the position you really have in effect identified these people, that you have given so much information from the government that they should be able to figure out or to discern who these people are. My concern is if that's the case, you know it is not that you are not disclosing these people, you are just making it little more difficult and requiring defense counsel to spend perhaps an excessive amount of time to get to ultimately where they should be entitled to get. Why can't you just tell them who they are instead of require them to have to sift through all the papers?

MR. GENSER: Judge, perhaps after this status conference I can speak with defense counsel and identify the individuals.

THE COURT: I direct you to do that based upon that.

I was going to direct Mr. Genser to do that because you have disclosed these people in effect.

MR. GENSER: I think they already know who they are.

THE COURT: Be specific about it so there could be no possible mistake.

MR. LEVITT: If I can add to the record in fact another member of the government team has disclosed that to us.

THE COURT: You are fine with that?

MR. LEVITT: I am fine with that. The only thing that hasn't been disclosed is the identity of the person who supposedly or whose potential testimony supposedly was obstructed in the obstruction of justice charge. I assume the government is willing to give me that.

MR. GENSER: I think we revealed that previously, Richard Bondi's stepson Anthony Frizetta.

THE COURT: This is the way we should go about our business. We're having this colloquy in Court and we are able to satisfy people's concerns rather than to have excessive paperwork.

Anything else?

MR. LEVITT: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me speak to Mr. Ciccone's lawyer now with respect to his motions.

MR. MITCHELL: John Mitch. I am going to appear on this.

THE COURT: I have a host of things you have raised on behalf of Mr. Ciccone. Let me see whether I have them all

itemized correctly. You let me know if I missed anything. All right.

I move to dismiss Count One, the racketeering conspiracy count, because you claim it is based upon improper theory of vicarious liability and/or is duplicative.

I don't believe that that is correct. There are two branches to that apparently.

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, if I may quickly, to summarize it. The problem I have with these sort of monolithic 1962 (c) counts, the law is clear each defendant commits his own 1962 (c) violation. He is not vicariously liable for the racketeering acts that are committed by others.

THE COURT: Nobody is suggesting that he is.

MR. MITCHELL: The indictment, most respectfully, does. If you look at the count, it talks about single pattern of racketeering act. There is not a "single," there is nine, because each individual defendant has to commit his own pattern.

THE COURT: I don't agree with that. Look, the indictment is pled exactly the way all these racketeering indictments are laid out. We know the jury is going to have to assess the criminal culpability of each defendant. We know that in Count One they all join together in terms of being charged with a conspiracy to engage in racketeering

activity and that it is part of an enterprise, and they are going to, of course, be kept to discrete racketeering acts that apply to them. We have predicate acts. It is in the indictment. It is all alleged in the indictment.

MR. MITCHELL: Most respectfully, Second Circuit has said it: You can't treat a 1962 (c) count as RICO conspiracy.

That's precisely what they are doing.

THE COURT: No, no, no. What you are suggesting is you carve out and separate a RICO conspiracy count in respect to each individual defendant.

MR. MITCHELL: No, sir. What I am saying you have the substantive RICO, the 1962 (c). Then you have RICO conspiracy 1962 (d). The problem is each individual person must commit a discrete 1962 (c) violation.

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. MITCHELL: Must have his own pattern of racketeering activity. What you had in Count One is nine separate discrete 1962 (c) counts, nine different crimes charged in a single count. There is no explanation offered as to how that couldn't be duplications other than the argument argued in the brief: This is the way we always do it.

The fact is they don't offer a single explanation.

They point to 108(b) to say somehow it justifies. It

doesn't. They point to the decision in United States v.

Hickey where the question wasn't even raised. For the life of me, most respectfully, how can you have nine separate crimes charged in a single count?

THE COURT: I don't think there is nine separate crimes. There is an overarching criminal conspiracy here.

MR. MITCHELL: That's the second count, RICO conspiracy count. The first count is a substantive count.

THE COURT: Mr. Genser, what do you say about that?

MR. GENSER: Judge, I think we're all familiar with indictments and counts in indictments that charge, let's say, ten or twelve or even twenty individuals with participating in the same crime. Each of those individuals, even though they are named in the same count, is charged in a separate crime. So there is no duplicity, as my colleague suggests.

I think your Honor is absolutely correct, there is no flaw in the way this indictment is pled. The indictment specifically states that each defendant committed two of the acts and so it is clear we are talking about a separate pattern for each defendant. It is simply a matter of drafting --

THE COURT: The jury is going to be properly charged, and certainly you have sufficient knowledge as to what the alleged crime is that your client is being charged with. I have no problem with that. What you are proposing

would just produce multiple additional pieces of paper without any real substantive value to that.

MR. MITCHELL: Here is the problem. The problem is, when you read the indictment as a layperson, indeed, if you read it as an experienced person --

THE COURT: I am not sure the jury is going to be reading the --

MR. MITCHELL: The allegation will be given. It suggests a single monolithic 1962 (c) substantive count. It suggests all the defendants are guilty of the pattern of racketeering activity that's pled.

THE COURT: Let me suggest this.

The motion is denied. The jury is going to be properly charged. It is more of a charging issue than, really, a pleading issue. The jury may not even see this indictment. I am not necessarily going to give it to them.

I am not exactly sure how I am going to husband all this information, but I am going to do it in a way so the jury can hopefully understand what this is all about.

I may not track the indictment. I generally don't give the jury the indictment. We deal with that when it comes to charging the jury. All right.

THE COURT: Let's go on to address -- count two I think falls in the same broad category. I am satisfied.

MR. MITCHELL: The problem with Count Two, your

Honor, 1962 (d) makes it a crime to conspire to commit a 1962 (c) violation. The problem is the second count says that the defendants are guilty of RICO conspiracy because they conspired to commit the 1962 (c) violation set forth in Count One. The problem with that is there isn't one of them.

There is nine of them.

THE COURT: What's wrong with that?

MR. MITCHELL: That's nine conspiracies in one count, your Honor.

THE COURT: Once again I think it is going to be a charging issue really, not an indictment issue.

All right. I looked over the indictment. I think it is properly pled. I think it is necessary to join a multiple number of defendants in respect to these crimes in counts one and two. Otherwise, we have a 200-page indictment which would make it more difficult for the Court to absorb than already is the case.

You have your record. Your motions are denied in respect to those two issues. I am more troubled by the third branch of your motion to dismiss Racketeering Act 23 because the subpredicate act 23 (c) does not qualify as a racketeering act. Also to dismiss racketeering acts 31 and 32 and count 66 and 67 for failure to allege all of the necessary elements of the offense under state law.

I am less troubled with racketeering some predicate

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23 (c). I am a little more troubled with 31 and 32 and count 66 and 67. I think 23 (c) is properly pled.

It is the extortion conspiracy and attempt in connection with the efforts to deprive John Doe one, who we know who that is, an employee of Holland Hook Container Terminal. Count 23 (c) brings with it the same conduct under the state law theory of --I should say 23 (c) cites specifically to New York Penal Law Section 110 which is a 1155.50, which is larceny by extortion and 155.40, which is grand larceny in the second degree. The only thing missing, it doesn't set forth the specific elements of those sections. Is it your position that the indictment is fall at this --

MR. MITCHELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- because you are claiming that the state statutes are not set forth in terms of their particular elements.

MR. MITCHELL: Yes, sir. I think now that's functionally the law of the Second Circuit after United States v. Cirrillo. It is also the thrust of the decision in United States v. Miller.

THE COURT: Wait a second. Go slow.

Look, the law is clear in the Second Circuit under Arena and under Cirrillo that you don't have to --

MR. MITCHELL: Those cases are not the law anymore in the circuit.

United States of Cirrillo -- C-i-r-r--

THE COURT: That's why I mentioned you read Cirrillo. Cirrillo says Arena is no longer good law.

THE COURT: Cirrillo makes it perfectly clear that for purposes of RICO predicate acts you only need to have the generic definition of the underlying state crime. Cirrillo does not say, as you contend, that you have to allege the specific elements of the state crime.

I read it carefully. I don't agree with your assessment. Your motion is denied with respect to 23 (c).

MR. MITCHELL: May I say one other thing? The reason why the state elements are necessary in the overarching federal crime is because even if you refer to a statute such as Penal Law Section 212, whatever it is, you don't have any guarantee that's what the grand jury considered. The grand jury obviously --

THE COURT: You are mixing, with all due respect, apples and bananas.

We are going to talk about counts 66 and 67 in a short period of time. We are right now talking about a RICO --

MR. MITCHELL: Here is the reasoning. The fact is, 23 (c) would be a misdemeanor under state law if it was an attempt to commit a generic extortion. The government says it is not a misdemeanor but a felony because there is a

specific extortion statute which is one step above the lowest felony and state law and therefore an attempt to commit it is a felony as well.

The fact is the only way that you know what the statute -- state statute they say he violated is a reference to the --

THE COURT: Let's talk about the substantive count. Let me read to you from Cirrillo just so we have effective dialogue.

The Court references Arena which wasn't overruled by saying that there we stated that only a generic definition of an underlying state crime is required in a RICO indictment as distinguished from the elements of the penal codes of the various states where acts of racketeering occur.

The Court in Cirrillo goes on to make it perfectly clear that while a generic definition is sufficient for purposes of pleading a RICO predicate count, indeed the government will have to establish and prove at the trial the requisite element under the state law.

That's the law of the Second Circuit. I don't agree with your assessment.

MR. MITCHELL: Most respectfully, your Honor, I don't think that Cirrillo ever focused on the grand jury question. It simply can't be. If it is an element of the offense, it can't be it doesn't need to be charged.

THE COURT: I made a record. I disagree with you. Sometimes I am wrong but --

MR. MITCHELL: It goes back to Russell and all those cases.

THE COURT: It is an important thing to make the record, and I will make my ruling.

I am more interested here where I am going to put pressure on the government attorneys to talk about the RICO predicate acts 31 and 32 as well as the substantive count 66 and 67.

Mr. Genser, in going through the indictment, I am puzzled about a few things. Bearing in mind what I just announced as the law for proper pleadings of RICO predicates and subpredicates, turn, if you would, to 31 and 32.

That is going to be at page 35 of the indictment. Do you follow with me?

You are alleging there is a predicate illegal gambling business. You talk about Joker Poker. I assume that means these are gambling machines you are referring to, Joker Poker. Am I correct?

MR. GENSER: Yes.

THE COURT: You allege violation under 1955 (2) which is the federal crime of course. You make no reference here to the sum of \$2,000 in a single day that is one of the elements under 1955. When you then plead Racketeering Act

32, which you also allege is a violation of 1955, you do make reference there to the sum of \$2,000 which satisfies 1955. You don't refer to the specific state penal codes as you do when you talk about the substantive counts in 66 and 67. You had some reason, I guess, in that respect. I am not so sure why you could not have made reference to the statutes even though under Cirrillo and Arena there is a looser standard, so to speak, for pleading RICO predicates than substantive counts, perhaps.

Why is it that you left out the \$2,000 for racketeering act 31? You will see the progression in my questioning after you answer that question.

MR. GENSER: I think I understand your Honor's concern. It is my understanding that the way Section 1955 works is there are alternative types of conduct that can violate the statute, and there is sort of an either or in terms of whether a business meets -- an illegal gambling business meets those elements. I think it is either \$2,000 in a single day or substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of 30 days.

THE COURT: I am trying to find what statutes you are referring to.

MR. GENSER: 1955.

THE COURT: What state law are you talking about?

MS. JESTIN: First addressing the federal law in

the first question you asked.

THE COURT: The 1955 requires \$2,000 in any single day.

MR. GENSER: What I am saying to your Honor, I believe 1955 doesn't require that. That is one way that the statute can be violated. It is that or --

THE COURT: What other part of 1955 would be implicated in this particular charge?

MR. GENSER: I don't have it right in front me.

THE COURT: You talk about five or more people. I am trying to follow the bouncing ball. I would like to know what you are referring to in terms of the state penal law. You may not have to set it for the --

MR. GENSER: I am addressing section 1955 subsection B.

THE COURT: B.

MR. GENSER: Subsection B, subindex 3B1.3 (b) defines an illegal gambling business means a gambling business which, one, is a violation of the law of the state or subdivision in which it is conducted. Two involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own all or part of such business. Three, has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of 30 days or has a gross revenue of \$2,000 in any single day.

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correct.

That is why -- that is not a requirement in every case. If you can show that the business --

THE COURT: In other words, if it has a 30-day continuity or the \$2,000.

MR. GENSER: Yes. It is definitely difficult to parse out. I think it is clear once you focus on that particular provision that that aspect of it is --

THE COURT: I can tell you. I read that and of course I read RICO Act 232. I am not and lay juror. I had a difficult time parsing out. You even had a difficult time parsing it out. I think in fairness to the defense, while we have this rather loose pleading requirement for predicate acts that they are entitled to have a little bit more knowledge of what you are talking about. They have a little more knowledge now than they had before.

MR. GENSER: We did try to identify the type of the gambling business in the indictment. It is not just boilerplate. We meant Joker Poker machines and things of that nature.

THE COURT: Let's turn to your substantive counts. Here, 66, which is Joker Poker, that is the name of the machine?

MS. JESTIN: Type of machine, yes, that is

THE COURT: You don't reference the \$2,000 there.

You do reference specifically Penal Law Section 225.10. It is the position of counsel you should do more than that, that you should set forth the elements of the state law. I don't think that necessarily is required, but I will hear from Mr. Mitchell about that so you can make a record.

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Let me finish first.

S2,000. When I look at 225.10, it doesn't say what you just told me your RICO predicate is all about. It does specifically talk about promoting gambling in the first degree. That's the specific reference you are making in count 66. Then the elements of that are twofold. The first one is engaging in bookmaking to the extent that he receives or accepts in any one day more than five bets totalling more than \$5,000. I don't see that at all in count 66. You are not really referencing that specific type of bookmaking activity which is the basis of 225.10.

May have had in mind, maybe, 225.30, which doesn't reference a \$5,000 threshold requirement. It talks about possession of a gambling device. I find considerable amount of confusion in terms of what it is you are specifically charging in that substantive count which I think requires at least reference to the state statute.

What's going on here?

MR. GENSER: Judge, I think the indictment in count 66, the Joker Poker indictment identifies New York Penal Law Section 225.10 as the state statute which is alleged to be violated. I am somewhat handicapped right now because I don't have a copy of that in front of me.

THE COURT: 225.10?

MR. GENSER: Yes.

THE COURT: Take my copy. You are talking about in count 66 gambling machines whereas 225.10 doesn't necessarily reference gambling machines. 25.30 does. Under 225.10, you have to have \$5,000. The federal statute requires \$2,000. Since we are talking about New York State, you have to deal with \$5,000 it seems to me. There may be other slants which has a \$2,000 requirement or \$500. Who knows?

The issue that really I am troubled with has the grand jury been presented with sufficient information to be able to render an indictment in respect to substantive count 66 and 67 based upon \$5,000.

MR. GENSER: Do you want to say something.

MR. MITCHELL: I am not anxious to say anything.

MR. GENSER: Section 225.10 offers two ways in which the statute can be violated. It also includes language that is defined elsewhere in the statute. I don't have it in front of me. There are definitions of what bookmaking actively is and what policy and lottery schemes and

enterprises are.

THE COURT: I have to read it. It seems to me you have to show \$5,000 of activity. You are telling me you don't.

MR. GENSER: That is under the first prong. The second prong is receiving in connection with policy or lottery scheme or enterprise, money or written records from a person other than a player who --

THE COURT: You are talking about gambling machines here. You are not really saying anything here that tracks that subdivision.

MR. GENSER: Judge, what I am saying is the definition of lottery or policy scheme as defined in the statute is broad enough to include a Joker Poker machine. A Joker Poker machine, lottery --

THE COURT: What is the purpose of 225.30 which talks about gambling devices which is exactly what you say in count 66?

MR. GENSER: Judge, I mean perhaps that could also have been charged as the underlying state violation but we have identified this statute.

THE COURT: I have some problems with whether you have legally properly pled 225.10 in count 66. I may require some further submissions from counsel.

Let's turn to --

MR. MITCHELL: Could I make one point on that?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MITCHELL: This is precisely what happened in United States v. Miller, which is an Eighth Circuit decision, the only Court of Appeals to ever decide this question. In Miller there was allegation that a particular state statute was violated but they didn't set forth the elements.

Here is what the Court in Miller said.

In Miller, the problem is that they do not even set forth the section of the state law.

In the decision it says an allegation that some state statute has been violated does not fully, directly, expressly without any uncertainty or ambiguity set forth all of the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished. The Court goes on to say -- I think this is particularly appropriate under the circumstances of what we're talking about now.

It says the indictment contained no assurance that the grand jury deliberated on the elements of any particular state offense. The indictment at bar contained no hint of the acts for which Miller was being indicted.

Your Honor just now, it was sort of convenient that the government couldn't even explain to you without referencing the statute precisely what the state law required. The grand jury would never have known that.

THE COURT: That's why we are talking about this.

Let me tell you about Miller here. I don't read Miller the way you do. The difference factually in Miller and in 66 and 67 is that in Miller was no reference whatsoever to anything other than 1955 (b), the federal law. There is no reference to the state statute.

MR. MITCHELL: That's true in 33 and 31.

THE COURT: Here.

Those are RICO acts which take on different aspects in terms of liberal requirements for pleading purposes. Now we are talking about substantive crimes. RICO acts are really governed -- I spoke about that. When we talk about the substantive crimes, I want to point out to you that's what is different in this case. The government does reference specific title, chapter, verse of the state crimes.

In Miller the Eighth Circuit distinguished a case from the Fifth Circuit called United States v. Marifield -- M-a-r-i-f-i-e-l-d -- saying the government's reliance on Marifield was misplaced by -- unlike the instant case, the indictment there described the conduct in question as the operation of a business for placing bets on dice and cards. The indictment also stated the title and section of the state law alleged to have been violated. I read Miller as drawing a distinction between an indictment which doesn't make any reference to the state statute by chapter, book and verse, so

to speak, as compared to a pleading such as we have here where there is specific reference to the actual penal law.

MR. MITCHELL: Your Honor, if I may. To what end does it serve? I mean, when you think about it from a practical level. The grand jury has no clue what that --

THE COURT: You are arguing about something which you suggest is a common sense type of thing which I tend to agree with you. I am talking about the law.

MR. MITCHELL: Constitutionally, your Honor, if it is an element of the offense, it has to be passed on by the grand jury.

THE COURT: I don't agree. I think for pleading purposes, to refer to the nature of the crime, specific information you spoke about, that little bit here and the reference to the particular state law of the statute by penal law doesn't have to have the elements set forth. That's why my reading even of Miller especially as pointed out the way it distinguishes the Fifth Circuit case in Marifield (sic). Think about that.

Let me now turn back to the government.

In 67, you do refer specifically to 225.10 and to the \$2,000. All right. Under 225.10 unlike 1955 you need \$5,000. How do I know whether the grand jury was presented with sufficient evidence to justify a \$5,000 scenario if for argument's sake all that was before the grand jury was

\$2,000. Then wouldn't I have to dismiss count 67 at the very least?

MR. GENSER: The answer to that is your Honor does not have to dismiss the count because your Honor can rely upon the fact that the jury was instructed, the grand jury was instructed on all of the elements of all of the offenses. We specifically listed the state statute they were instructed --

THE COURT: Did you tell the jury they had to be satisfied that there is \$5,000?

MR. GENSER: Yes, judge.

THE COURT: What you'll do is send to me in camera that part of the grand jury minutes where you gave the jury that instruction and also, you know, support it with that part of the grand jury minutes which shows that we're not just dealing with \$2,000 but we are dealing with \$5,000.

MR. MITCHELL: Since it is not evidentiary, could we see that?

THE COURT: No. Let me take a look at it. I think that's the right way to proceed. I think you can trust my judgment on these things.

MR. MITCHELL: Very well, your Honor.

THE COURT: If I find that the jury wasn't charged-- if they were charged only on \$2,000 and there is nothing to support \$5,000, I will dismiss that count. Let me

take a look.

MR. GENSER: I believe that the minutes will satisfy your Honor's concern.

I would like to also point out that the section referenced 225.10 has those two different definitions of gambling activities. Those are terms of art defined in a statute. I believe that the lottery and policy scheme prong also would cover --

THE COURT: Maybe you have to give fair notice if you are not going to set forth the particular elements which as I read the law apparently you don't have to. I think at least you have to make clear which aspect of a particular statute you rely upon by making appropriate substantive reference in the language you use in the count.

In respect to both 66 and 67, I want you to submit to me for my in camera review what you have before the grand jury that you believe would support your claims. I will be particularly interested to see how you charge the grand jury on count 66.

You understand what I need. We'll take a very close look at that. You are clear about my rulings at least?

MR. MITCHELL: Yes.

THE COURT: You have a record.

All right

Would you be kind enough to do that by maybe next

Tuesday so I can also take that to Puerto Rico with me? I would like to come to peace with what is going to survive in the indictment well in advance of the start of the trial.

MR. GENSER: Very well.

THE COURT: Let's see what else is left here.

I am going to deny all of the other motions. It is Mr. Mitchell?

MR. MITCHELL: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have listed here that you take objection to what you claim is the consolidation of several counts because they are subsets of one larger offense. That is an outgrowth of some of the things we discussed before. I deny that.

MR. MITCHELL: It is actually the other way around though.

THE COURT: Yes. Then you have this issue of whether or not you can charge a crime composed of the deprivation of so-called democratic rights. You can. My understanding of where the circuit is at in that respect is reflected in United States v. Bolomo, 176 F.3rd 580, specifically at 592 to 593.

MR. MITCHELL: I don't disagree with that. The reason principally this is raised, the Supreme Court is going to hear --

THE COURT: You want to preserve your rights.

MR. MITCHELL: Right.

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The Supreme Court is going to reach in NOW vs. Schindler --THE COURT: Do you need what I said? I said I

refer to United States v. Bolomo, which is 76 F.3rd 508 at pages 592 to 593. Then Mr. Mitchell said he was just preserving the record, agrees that is the position of the Second Circuit and that apparently certiorari has been granted.

MR. MITCHELL: In the case of NOW v. Schindler, it was a civil RICO case in which the National Organization Of Women went after antiabortionists and the predicates that they used were Hobbs Act, saying it was deprivation of property to deprive woman of abortional services.

The Court is going to hear the issue on whether or not that's a sufficient property right to justify Hobbs Act.

THE COURT: It is wise of course of counsel to preserve your rights. I don't see where this case dealing with deprivation of union benefits is quite the same thing as the NOW case. We'll see how it washes out. The issues is preserved.

I read another case by the Second Circuit as reinforcing the position that the indictment properly alleges deprivation of property rights, United States v. Arena at 180 F.3d, 380, at page 392. That also is a 99 Second Circuit

decision. That talks about the Hobbs Act being not limited to tangible things but includes intangible assets, such as the right to solicit customers and conduct unlawful business.

You have a proper record.

MR. MITCHELL: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

The last thing you raise is how the forfeiture count, which is what count 72 or something like, that is to be processed. My understanding, first you have to get a conviction and then there could be a subsequent proceeding focusing on the forfeiture issue if the government wishes to proceed on that basis and separate evidence would have to be forthcoming.

I don't think we have to deal with that now.

MR. MITCHELL: The only question is, does the jury decide--

THE COURT: My understanding, the jury decides in a separate proceeding.

MR. MITCHELL: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you agree with that?

MR. GENSER: I think I do, judge, but I think your Honor is right. We can cross that bridge when we get to it.

THE COURT: We have enough on our plate right now.

I have handled all of your motions.

Mr. Mitchell, is there anything I may have

inadvertedly left out?

Mitch no, sir. I believe that's it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The last thing I have on my list that is pending is the Bondi motion. Unless there is something else to talk about, we can let everybody else go home and keep you captured here since we have different issues that flow from the hearing we had. We could take a little break right now.

Is there anything else we need to do with everybody else?

MR. SHARGEL: No.

THE COURT: I will see you Tuesday morning 10:00.

Thank you all for you cooperation. Let's take a ten-minute break.

Mr. Bondi's attorney will stay behind.

(Recess).

THE COURT: Let's now focus on the issue of the bond that flows from the hearing that the Court conducted on October 24th, 2002. Mr. Medina is here. The government counsel is still standing tall here.

Mr. Medina, my heart is sympathetically disposed to your plight. I guess if the \$30,000 was released, arguably, as a practical matter, there may be some fees due to you and that would be a source of funds. I can't do it for you. I labored hard over thinking about whether he could do it for

you. In good conscience to my oath of office, I can't. I will tell you why.

First of all, let me just make sure that we're not dealing with any issue as to whether the underlying warrant was valid and was properly executed. I thought we cleared the decks on that during our colloquy when I said we don't have to deal with the issue. You agreed. Yet, in your papers you still revisited that issue.

There is no problem here with the search warrant or the search.

MR. MEDINA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to have the opportunity to somehow say something different to me now than what you said to me back in October?

MR. MEDINA: Judge, I think the essential issue here was whether or not the government had met their burden of proof with respect to whether or not these particular proceeds were the proceeds of crime.

THE COURT: I am going to deal with that. I am talking about, for the nicety of the record, so to speak, the issue of whether you are questioning whether the search warrant was valid or whether it was validly executed. You have not yet answered that. Your papers seem to fly back and forth a little bit even to this date on that issue.

I try to lay that to rest when we were last here on

October 24th. I have this colloquy. I asked you whether, Mr. Medina, you had ever really raised this issue before. You really seriously want the opportunity to question whether there was a legitimate basis to obtain the search warrant because I think you may have said that. It doesn't seem as if you are really serious about that. You said no, your Honor.

So we don't have to deal with that. We are going to hold that and not deal with anything dealing with the search warrant.

MR. MEDINA: The probable cause issue --

THE COURT: Okay. We are squared away on that.

Let me just set forth the facts which I believe in the hearing I think arguably are relevant to the decision which I am constrained to render against your client.

One, October 28th, 2001, Richard Bondi received a settlement in the amount of \$60,790.40. Those are legitimate funds. Nobody is questioning that. The next day, October 29, he opened a bank account at the Granateville Shop-Rite Branch of Staten Island Bank and Trust. Mr. Bondi had other accounts at the bank, as a repeat customer was eligible to make withdrawals from the new account without waiting for a 30-day grace period to pass.

According to the witness, Lisa Miguel, the assistant manager at the bank, the bank would even be willing

to cash the check without waiting for the check to clear if requested by the customer.

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Three, on November 1, 2001, Mr. Bondi withdrew \$2,000 from this account. On November 2, November 3, November 5, November 6, November 7, November 8, November 9 and November 13, he withdrew \$6,000 on each of those days, leaving a total of \$790.40. So \$60,000 was taken from the bank.

Four, Mr. Bondi could have withdrawn the entire amount at one time from the larger branch located a half mile away. Additionally, according to Ms. Miguel, the bank would have been willing to cover a withdrawal of the entire amount from the Graniteville branch within a few days' notice to receive a delivery of the cash if Mr. Bondi had asked.

Five, approximately three months later, on January 22, 2002, a Court ordered search warrant based upon probable cause was issued by the Honorable Allan J. Meyer, judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York to search the Bondi residence for, amongst other things, gambling records and United States currency and other proceeds of illegal bookmaking.

Six, the police found \$30,000 of which \$28,700 was in \$100 bills. All this money was bundled and stored in a garment bag in a closet in the master bedroom.

Seven, Richard Bondi at the time the \$30,000 in

question was removed from his home claimed the money was a result of an accident settlement.

Eight, three weeks later, on February 11, 2002, Special Investigator Joe Poccia overheard a conversation in which Richard Bondi and other defendants appeared to be speaking about money. Their conversation, although somewhat garbled, is construed by the Court as referring to the money as contraband/gambling proceeds or might be construed.

I will not make that specific factual finding. I will just note that it arguably could be construed as referring to the money as contraband gambling proceeds but it is not necessary for me to specifically so find in terms of the decision which I am rendering more specifically.

During the exchange of conversation Sunny Ciccone stated: Let's see if we are going to tie this money into the machines," and Bondi stated, "I got the best explanation to prove where that money came from."

Nine, Special Agent Poccia said that the machines that Richard Bondi collected money from did not take \$100. However, he also testified that in his experience money was often packed in large bills and bundled in even number of dollars.

Last, No. Ten, Richard Bondi produced no receipts showing where the settlement money has been spent nor did he testify or offer any evidence other than calling Ms. Miller--

Medina I think you called her as well.

MR. MEDINA: That is correct.

THE COURT: Those are salient facts. Let me now articulate my conclusions.

If a motion for return of property is made while a criminal prosecution is pending, the burden is on the movant to show that he or she is entitled to the property.

Generally a rule 41 (e) motion is properly denied if the defendant is not entitled to lawful possession of the seized property, the property is contraband, or subject to forfeiture or the government's need for the property as evidence continues.

Here, in the Court's judgment, Bondi has not sustained his burden of proof which is by the preponderance of the evidence that the property is not contraband. The money is clearly not contraband per se, however it appears to be derivative contraband.

There are two types of contraband; namely, contraband per se and derivative contraband. Included in the term contraband per se are things which intrinsically are illegal to possess such as illegal narcotics, unregistered stills, counterfeit money, sawed off shotguns and illicit gambling devices. Included in the term derivative contraband are things that are not ordinarily illegal, like guns, automobiles, ships and currency that become forfeitable

because of their relationship with a criminal act.

Bearing in mind that the defendant has the burden of proof, the fact that the money was in a large sum, it was kept tied up in a rubber band and stored in a garment bag in the bedroom closet suggests Bondi had knowledge that this money was incriminating, and the fact that there was no explanation given to the Court whatsoever as to what happened to the \$6,000 that was withdrawn three months prior to the search warrant being executed is troublesome to the Court. It may well be that that money was kept there as a cover for illegal gambling activities. It may be that it was lawful. But there is no explanation that I have as to why that money was drawn out and \$30,000 of it was kept three months later in these most suspicious locations.

MR. MEDINA: May I be heard, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am just giving you my decision.

I think it was incumbent upon the defendant, consistent with its burden of proof, to offer something more than the fact that there was \$6,000 of lawful moneys that were initially placed in a bank account. I don't understand why people would take all that money out, why three months later there would be \$30,000 that would be found in a garment bag. All of that is counterintuitive to the Court in terms of being able to conclude that the defendant sustained his burden of proving to the Court in the face of this particular

motion that these moneys conclusively did not constitute contraband. That is the problem I have with the case.

Mr. Bondi did not have to testify. That was his right. I needed something more than the fact that three months prior there were lawful funds put in a bank. I don't have that. That is really what ultimately has triggered my decision that you haven't met your burden of proof.

When it comes to dealing arguably with a forfeiture scenario, there the burden shifts to the government. If the government wanted to have that money deemed to be forfeited funds, it would have to go forward and satisfy the Court that indeed they should be forfeited. I think these shifting burdens really make all the difference in the world for resources out.

Let me explain. I was concerned about what possible res judicata the collateral consequences with respect to any future issues such as forfeiture might be triggered by the Court's decision. I haven't been able to locate any case law dealing with that particular issue. If there is going to be a future forfeiture proceeding, the determination on Bondi's current motions will have no controlling effect over such a forfeiture proceeding.

I thought I ought to make that clear. They don't preclude any argument in the future that the Court has already ruled this is contraband and therefore it is

automatically.

I think the circuit's recent decision in United States v. U.S. Currency in the amount of \$119,984 at 304 Fed. 165 rendered this year, 2002, makes it clear that there are separate burdens and separate processes that the parties would be able to avail themselves of. There would be the opportunity to have discovery in both sides and the government would be able to go forward if it chooses to do so to claim that indeed these funds should be forfeited. We are not dealing with that here today.

It may well be that they won't be able to sustain that burden and the money will go back to you, to your client, at that time.

That is basically my take. That's my decision in denying the motion.

If you wish to say something on the record, I will give you the opportunity.

MR. MEDINA: Absolutely, your Honor. It was my reading of Rule 41 (e) and your Honor reading of 41 (E) when we had the hearing that a 41 (e) proceeding for the return of property post-indictment shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12. Your Honor ruled that based upon that, this was now a motion to suppress under Rule 12 where it was the government's burden of proof to demonstrate that these particular proceeds were the specific proceeds of a

crime, that they were in fact -- that these particular --

THE COURT: I may have said that but I come to the conclusion that the burden is here upon you and I may be wrong about that but that's my take.

What do you think Mr. Genser, am I right?

MR. MEDINA: If I could just be heard. I understand what your Honor is saying. That's what your Honor ruling was before the hearing and that was the parameters of the hearing. That is what we based that on and that's how we cross-examine the witness and that's how we presented our case. It is one thing to say these are the rules of the game, this is the burden of proof is now on the defense.

THE COURT: I reconsider. I will reconsider my decision.

What do you say, Mr. Genser?

MR. GENSER: Judge, I have to say that the motion should be as a motion to suppress where the burden is on the government, I don't think even if we accepted that as true and as the applicable standard, I don't think it changes the outcome here.

A suppression motion attacks the legality of the seizure. All the government would need to do to sustain its burden on the motion to suppress would be to prove the warrant was properly executed lawfully and that the contraband, there was probable cause at the time to believe

that the evidence appeared to be contraband.

Nothing that your Honor has said or that Mr. Medina has said would suggest that the government failed to meet that burden. There is no additional burden in a suppression motion for the government to prove specifically that the money is forfeitable.

MR. MEDINA: We are not talking about forfeiture. We are talking about identifying that as contraband. That was the focus of the hearing. That's what your Honor took evidence on.

THE COURT: I do recall now maybe I did say that the burden is upon the government.

I will have to reconsider my decision if that is the case.

MR. MEDINA: That is the case. It is stated here in the minutes.

THE COURT: That's what I told my law clerk. I have to decide who decides who has the burden under this particular statute.

I thought we had it down right. Maybe not.

MR. MEDINA: If I could read.

"Now my understanding of the way things should proceed, Mr. Medina, certainly a motion can be made by the defendant for the return of property that the government has in its possession. The motion is governed by Rule 41 (e) of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I take it that you folks have looked at that. The sense that this is to be treated as a motion to suppress under Rule 12 that is specifically referenced in 41 (e), that places the burden on the government to support the retention of the property. Is that right, Mr. Wail (ph)?

"Mr. Wail: Yes, judge."

That's how we proceeded, judge. That's the burden of proof that I was going under, your Honor.

THE COURT: I will reconsider my decision in light of that.

Thank you for calling that to my attention. We'll see what goes on in the future when I come to peace with that issue.

MR. MEDINA: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. GENSER: Thank you, judge.

THE COURT: If you want to submit anything at all dealing with the burden of proof, I don't have any specifics in front of me as to what the law is in that respect. We have this peculiar intersection between 41 and 12 here and that's what troubles me.

MR. GENSER: Your Honor, I would just suggest that on the record that your Honor has recited the government did, even assuming that there was an extra burden on the government to prove that the funds were specifically

forfeitable, that we've satisfied it and I would query whether Mr. Medina wants to make a proffer as to whether there would be some additional evidence he would have liked to submit if it turns out that your Honor ends up deciding that the burden was on him. What is there that we're all missing?

That might help us all to figure it out and get to the bottom.

THE COURT: Do you want to say something else?

MR. MEDINA: Your Honor, we had a hearing. We made
a record based on what your Honor's ruling was, what the
burden of proof of was. I think Rule 41 (e) is very clear --

THE COURT: I am going to deny this.

I am going to say now on the record that even if I am wrong and the burden is on the government, based upon the findings that I have made, the government has satisfied its burden.

You are not going to get the money back now.

MR. MEDINA: Your Honor, based upon the fact that your Honor has made a finding that the standard of proof was on me --

THE COURT: I am saying that in any event, I will render the same --

MR. MEDINA: In the interests of fairness, when I am litigating a hearing and I am told that the burden is on

the government, and now your Honor is saying the burden was on me, I respectfully request an opportunity to reopen the hearing because I never had an opportunity to properly address the burden of proof.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. I have a lot of things to do here.

If I am now saying even if the burden is on the government, which is what you were appropriately apprised was my initial determination, that the government has sustained its burden under these facts that I have mentioned. The highly suspicious nature of these funds, the tape that I listened to, the fact that these moneys were taken out, that there is reference here that he's got a very good excuse for the money, whatever that statement was all about, again, I think it supports the government's burden. I am not going to go beyond this.

MR. MEDINA: If I could address those. The fact money was taken out that the government and Court has acknowledged was legitimate money in the bank, judge, the way it was taken out is clearly irrelevant.

THE COURT: I don't agree. You have my decision.

I'm sorry for the confusion I may have caused, but in any event, that's my decision.

MR. MEDINA: Thank you.

MS. JESTIN: Have a nice weekend, judge.

